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What is an identity, exactly? (2 of 2)
(continuing the previous article...)
> and we often hear that the human body
> completely rebuilds itself cell-by-cell,
> about every thirty days (This isn't
> exactly true, but it is fun to think
> about.) Anyway, inking our identity to
> our physical body is problematic, even
> though it's awfully convenient.
There are science fiction writers who
have done thought experiments with these
topics.
If a human being can be duplicated by,
say, perfectly synchronized cell
divisions, which copy is the original?
Can one of them be destroyed without
killing the individual? If the being feels
himself continuous even when he is copied
into two beings, can the copying be
similarly done over a vast distance? Or
over a vast period of time?
Are the copies of a being part of the
same being, or new beings, even if they
feel to grow from the same origin? Can
the copies merge together again?
Can a human being be copied into
a machine imitating him with high
fidelity? Can the sense of time of the
machine-human be bound to the internal
states of the machine, and can these
states be run backwards, or in a shuffled
order with no harm to the machine-human?
Could the machine-human life and
thoughts be run on paper and pencils
instead of computers? Do the calculations
really need to be done, or can the being
exist and live in our thoughts, or in the
world of mathematics without our aid? Do
we need substance to exist?
To me a dualistic (or at least
supermaterial) model of humanity feels
much more harmonious, especially if the
human being does not perish at death, as
that seems to me the only way to
give and get love that does not expire.
Our sense of morality and responsibility
are also built on the assumption that we
have a (more or less) free will, even
though our science cannot show this
freedom to us.
Puti
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Language pair: Finnish; Thai
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