What is an identity, exactly? (2 of 2)
(continuing the previous article...)
> and we often hear that the human body
> completely rebuilds itself cell-by-cell,
> about every thirty days (This isn't
> exactly true, but it is fun to think
> about.) Anyway, inking our identity to
> our physical body is problematic, even
> though it's awfully convenient.
There are science fiction writers who
have done thought experiments with these
topics.
If a human being can be duplicated by,
say, perfectly synchronized cell
divisions, which copy is the original?
Can one of them be destroyed without
killing the individual? If the being feels
himself continuous even when he is copied
into two beings, can the copying be
similarly done over a vast distance? Or
over a vast period of time?
Are the copies of a being part of the
same being, or new beings, even if they
feel to grow from the same origin? Can
the copies merge together again?
Can a human being be copied into
a machine imitating him with high
fidelity? Can the sense of time of the
machine-human be bound to the internal
states of the machine, and can these
states be run backwards, or in a shuffled
order with no harm to the machine-human?
Could the machine-human life and
thoughts be run on paper and pencils
instead of computers? Do the calculations
really need to be done, or can the being
exist and live in our thoughts, or in the
world of mathematics without our aid? Do
we need substance to exist?
To me a dualistic (or at least
supermaterial) model of humanity feels
much more harmonious, especially if the
human being does not perish at death, as
that seems to me the only way to
give and get love that does not expire.
Our sense of morality and responsibility
are also built on the assumption that we
have a (more or less) free will, even
though our science cannot show this
freedom to us.
Puti
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Language pair: Finnish; Thai
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Juha-Petri T.
June 1, 2005
# Msgs: 1
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What is an identity, exactly? (1 of 2)
Hi again, Mark, and Dwyn, too!
> [...] it really fascinates me how much
> we seem to think we know about this and
> how little we actually do.
My favourite stuff. :-)
> "I," for Descartes, is the person who
> experiences thought. That is where our
> identity lies.
To me the sense of self is a little bit
of mystery. The fact that to me there is
only one "I", and all the others are
"them" makes me unique, but the other
people sense this same uniquity from their
own viewpoints. We are equal, and yet we
are not.
> If my mind, my soul, or whatever magical
> force/substance/isness that makes me a
> self-aware thinking being is the core of
> my identity, it must be in some way
> connected with my physical being, with
> my body. If that is so, there must
> somewhere be some identifiable
> connection whereby we can see how it is
> that the content of my will gets
> transformed somehow into the dynamic
> phenomenon of my action.
The concept of free will is even a
greater mystery than the concept of ego.
If we take the materialistic viewpoint,
the human ego is caused by the physical
functions of the brain, and only by it.
This really seems to be the easiest
approach, but it is also the most
dreadful one. If there is no latitude in
the tight chain of cause and effect, the
whole universe (and we within it) is just
running through the determined program
like a spring-driven toy. In that model
the human beings are neither human nor
beings, but just parts of the phenomenon
called Universe. Our thinking, moral, and
our whole existence would be fraudulent,
meaningless illusions.
If, on the other hand, we are beings and
have even some sovereignty over our brains
and bodies, we become physical miracles.
What is our invisible spirit guiding our
thoughts? Why does it stop functioning
together with our brains when somebody
hits us unconscious? Are the out-of-body
experiences real?
(To be continued...)
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Language pair: Finnish; Thai
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Juha-Petri T.
June 1, 2005
# Msgs: 1
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